Barack Obama shocked the Washington foreign policy establishment when, back in 2007, he said, “we’ve got to talk directly to Iran.” It was a policy prescription that beltway insiders may have considered but certainly none openly discussed. To do so would have been “naïve,” which is exactly what then candidate Obama was called.
In his new book, Reset: Iran, Turkey and America’s Future, Stephen Kinzer argues why – and, more importantly, shows us how – that position toward the Iranians is worth pursuing.
Kinzer, a former New York Times reporter who reported from Iran, does so by writing not just about Iran. Reset covers the greater Middle East, specifically Saudi Arabia, Israel and Turkey. Along with Iran, these countries, Kinzer says, hold the key to America’s foreign policy in the region.
They are keys, Kinzer says, that have been traditionally in the hands of Saudi Arabia and Israel. That was when the cold war made the kingdom’s riches and the Jewish state’s anti-communism indispensible to America. With the collapse of the East-West, however, those factors are less relevant. In fact, Kinzer says they’re “undermining America’s own interests.”
Without overwhelming us with history, Kinzer skillfully chronicles Washington’s financial relationship with Saudi Arabia and military one with Israel. Saudi Arabia’s “open checkbook” not only encouraged the United States to take a bold and active stand in the Middle East, it, along with America’s “distorted” bond with Israel, gave rise to the Islamic extremism that plagues the world today.
Kinzer calls America’s relationship with Israel distorted because it is not based on “historical reasons” or “regional peace.” Until the end of the cold war, it was based on American military power. “Eager to wage covert cold war battles in various parts of the world but were hampered by troublesome legal restrictions,” he writes, “Israel became a prized semisecret partner of the United States: a trainer of anti-Communist forces that the United States could not directly train, a conduit for arming regimes and rebel groups the United States could not openly arm, and a productive source of intelligence from around the world.”
The end of the cold war should have changed that relationship. It didn’t. Washington, Kinzer argues, continues to “treat Israel in a way that weakens Israel’s own security,” by promoting policies that lurch “helplessly from crisis to crisis.” That is counterproductive for everyone. The solution Kinzer proposes is for Washington to “reset” its foreign policy focus away from Saudi Arabia and Israel toward a closer engagement with Iran and Turkey.
Turkey, a place Kinzer lived for four years in the late 1990s, has always been an American ally, despite recent tensions in the relationship. That Kinzer attributes to Turkey’s new approach to the world. The country has “turned away from its traditional foreign policy, which was based on relations with Europe and the United States.” Today, under an Islamic-inclined government, it is much more active in the Middle East, adopting a “zero problems with neighbors” policy. Though Kinzer finds this encouraging, he acknowledges the discomfort that has given many in Washington who don’t like seeing Turkey engage with the likes of Syria and Iran.
Precisely because Turkey can engage with Syria and Iran is why, Kinzer writes, the United States should develop a closer alliance with Ankara. As the only democratic Muslim country in the region, “Turkey can go places, engage partners, and make deals that America cannot.”
“But is the United States,” Kinzer asks, “so long accustomed to acting on its own, ready to be guided?” Here, the Reset author, is less confident. “America has little experience in listening to other powers.” Given Hillary Clinton’s temper tantrum following the nuclear fuel swap deal Turkey concluded with Iran last month, with Brazilian support, this appears to be true.
Washington flatly rejected the very nuclear agreement it offered Tehran just six months earlier, but that the Islamic republic accepted when its western neighbor and Brazil proposed it. Why? Kinzer believes it’s because the United States shapes its foreign policy toward Iran based on emotion rather than logic.
“Some powerful Americans are still trapped by their anger at Iran, stemming from the deeply traumatic hostage crisis of 1979-81… These Americans have spent decades trying to punish Iran.” Part of that punishment has been a refusal to negotiate with Tehran. Yet after thirty years, that refusal hasn’t gotten America closer to the “peace” and “stability” it says it wants to see in the Middle East.
“The states have become too high for Americans to accept that option,” Kinzer writes. The time has come for the United States to change its policy toward Iran and the entire region. It must start by Washington distancing itself from Saudi Arabia and Israel and fortifying a new “power triangle” with Turkey and Iran.
Kinzer acknowledges that, “in order to become a reliable American partner, Iran would have to change dramatically.” So too would the United States. Barack Obama’s campaign comments are an indication it is ready to do. Perhaps after reading Reset: Iran, Turkey and America’s Future it actually can.
U.S. to Iran: Let’s be friends
In his new book, Reset: Iran, Turkey and America’s Future, Stephen Kinzer argues why – and, more importantly, shows us how – that position toward the Iranians is worth pursuing.
Kinzer, a former New York Times reporter who reported from Iran, does so by writing not just about Iran. Reset covers the greater Middle East, specifically Saudi Arabia, Israel and Turkey. Along with Iran, these countries, Kinzer says, hold the key to America’s foreign policy in the region.
They are keys, Kinzer says, that have been traditionally in the hands of Saudi Arabia and Israel. That was when the cold war made the kingdom’s riches and the Jewish state’s anti-communism indispensible to America. With the collapse of the East-West, however, those factors are less relevant. In fact, Kinzer says they’re “undermining America’s own interests.”
Without overwhelming us with history, Kinzer skillfully chronicles Washington’s financial relationship with Saudi Arabia and military one with Israel. Saudi Arabia’s “open checkbook” not only encouraged the United States to take a bold and active stand in the Middle East, it, along with America’s “distorted” bond with Israel, gave rise to the Islamic extremism that plagues the world today.
Kinzer calls America’s relationship with Israel distorted because it is not based on “historical reasons” or “regional peace.” Until the end of the cold war, it was based on American military power. “Eager to wage covert cold war battles in various parts of the world but were hampered by troublesome legal restrictions,” he writes, “Israel became a prized semisecret partner of the United States: a trainer of anti-Communist forces that the United States could not directly train, a conduit for arming regimes and rebel groups the United States could not openly arm, and a productive source of intelligence from around the world.”
The end of the cold war should have changed that relationship. It didn’t. Washington, Kinzer argues, continues to “treat Israel in a way that weakens Israel’s own security,” by promoting policies that lurch “helplessly from crisis to crisis.” That is counterproductive for everyone. The solution Kinzer proposes is for Washington to “reset” its foreign policy focus away from Saudi Arabia and Israel toward a closer engagement with Iran and Turkey.
Turkey, a place Kinzer lived for four years in the late 1990s, has always been an American ally, despite recent tensions in the relationship. That Kinzer attributes to Turkey’s new approach to the world. The country has “turned away from its traditional foreign policy, which was based on relations with Europe and the United States.” Today, under an Islamic-inclined government, it is much more active in the Middle East, adopting a “zero problems with neighbors” policy. Though Kinzer finds this encouraging, he acknowledges the discomfort that has given many in Washington who don’t like seeing Turkey engage with the likes of Syria and Iran.
Precisely because Turkey can engage with Syria and Iran is why, Kinzer writes, the United States should develop a closer alliance with Ankara. As the only democratic Muslim country in the region, “Turkey can go places, engage partners, and make deals that America cannot.”
“But is the United States,” Kinzer asks, “so long accustomed to acting on its own, ready to be guided?” Here, the Reset author, is less confident. “America has little experience in listening to other powers.” Given Hillary Clinton’s temper tantrum following the nuclear fuel swap deal Turkey concluded with Iran last month, with Brazilian support, this appears to be true.
Washington flatly rejected the very nuclear agreement it offered Tehran just six months earlier, but that the Islamic republic accepted when its western neighbor and Brazil proposed it. Why? Kinzer believes it’s because the United States shapes its foreign policy toward Iran based on emotion rather than logic.
“Some powerful Americans are still trapped by their anger at Iran, stemming from the deeply traumatic hostage crisis of 1979-81… These Americans have spent decades trying to punish Iran.” Part of that punishment has been a refusal to negotiate with Tehran. Yet after thirty years, that refusal hasn’t gotten America closer to the “peace” and “stability” it says it wants to see in the Middle East.
“The states have become too high for Americans to accept that option,” Kinzer writes. The time has come for the United States to change its policy toward Iran and the entire region. It must start by Washington distancing itself from Saudi Arabia and Israel and fortifying a new “power triangle” with Turkey and Iran.
Kinzer acknowledges that, “in order to become a reliable American partner, Iran would have to change dramatically.” So too would the United States. Barack Obama’s campaign comments are an indication it is ready to do. Perhaps after reading Reset: Iran, Turkey and America’s Future it actually can.